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Agricultural Zoning in Pennsylvania: Will
Growth Pressure Prevail?
I. Introduction
The United States is blessed with vast quantities of productive
farmland. Agricultural production continues to be a major part of
our national economy' and of the Pennsylvania economy.2 As urban
areas expand, prime farmland is converted to nonagricultural uses.3
Despite these losses, American farmers prevent agricultural produc-
tion from shrinking by increasing the productivity of remaining land
through the use of energy intensive practices,4 technological ad-
vances in plant productivity, and improved cultivation techniques. 5
Traditionally, the shift of agricultural land to urban uses was consid-
ered natural and inevitable.6 Apparently inexhaustible acreage
seemed equal to the task of supplying both the nation's food needs
and its export requirements. Current agricultural surpluses and fed-
eral government programs to slow production 7 lead some commenta-
tors to suggest that the warnings of a farmland crisis are greatly
overstated. 8 Those who fear a farmland crisis analyze the situation
I. In 1978, the market value of agricultural products in the United States was over
108 billion dollars. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, PART 51, 1978 CEN-
SUS OF AGRICULTURE. SUMMARY & STATE DATA 6 (1981).
2. In 1978, the market value of agricultural products in Pennsylvania was
$2,189,594,000. Id. at 446.
3. See infra notes 9-10.
4. Increased yield depends heavily on the application of petrochemical fertilizers. A
sharp reduction in the average annual increase in crop yield per acre during the 1970s, at
0.76% per year, was partly attributable to the rising costs of fuel and fertilizer caused by the
oil shortages occurring at that time. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, FINAL
REPORT 14 (1981). See generally Adams, King & Johnston, Effects of Energy Cost Increases
and Regional Allocation Policies in Agricultural Production, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 444
(1977). Although agricultural technologies are available that are less reliant on fossil fuel and
chemical inputs, these require a greater acreage of prime farmland to achieve equal productiv-
ity. See Klepper, Economic Performance and Energy Intensiveness on Organic and Conven-
tional Farms in the Corn Belt: A Preliminary Comparison, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1 (1977).
5. Geier, Agricultural Districts and Zoning. A State-Local Approach to a National
Problem, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 660-61 (1980).
6. Toner, Local Programs to Save Farms and Farmlands, in FARMLAND, FOOD & THE
FUTURE (M. Schnepf ed. 1979).
7. See generally Wehr, Farm Economic Plight Pushes U.S. Aid to Record Levels, 40
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT No. 24, 1389 (June 12, 1982).
8. One of the strongest critics of the "crisis" mentality is Professor Baden. See Baden,
Agricultural Land Preservation: Threshing the Wheat from the Chaff, PLAN., ZONING, AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 171 (1983). He provides data to show that increases in yields per acre have
been accompanied by slight increases in harvested acres. Id. at 176-77. He challenges the view
that government involvement is required to preserve an adequate amount of farmland and
describes agricultural zoning as ineffective and often accompanied by political corruption. In-
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from a global perspective.9 Whether the loss of farmland is charac-
terized as a "crisis" is unimportant; however, it is important that
planners and policymakers realize that good farmland is a finite
resource.
10
Nationally, 23.4 million acres of farmland were converted to
nonagricultural uses in the eight year period from 1967-1975;"
Pennsylvania loses over 125,000 acres annually to nonagricultural
uses. 2 For the most part this conversion is irreversible. 3 Even where
the process is reversible, the cost and technological barriers are pro-
hibitive. 14 The largest part of this conversion is for urban uses, al-
though some of it involves nonurban competition for land.'" Pennsyl-
vania feels this competitive pressure more acutely than many other
states. On the one hand, it has several rapidly expanding metropoli-
tan areas that are encroaching on surrounding prime farmland.'" On
the other hand, agriculture is an integral and significant part of
Pennsylvania's economy that deserves protection.
17
In the past decade federal and state lawmakers have heard
these warnings and have begun to heed them. In the mid- to late-
1970's, the United States Department of Agriculture issued policy
directives that were designed to encourage preservation of prime
farmland.' 8 In 1981, Congress passed the Farmland Protection Pol-
stead, he suggests that the market will operate to select land use alternatives which promote
efficient resource use. See also Policy Statement of the Urban Land Institute Board of Direc-
tors, URB. LAND 18 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Sampson, The Ethical Dimension of Farmland Protection in FARMLAND,
FOOD & THE FUTURE 89 (M. Schnepf ed. 1979); Little, Farmland and the Future in FARM-
LAND, FOOD & THE FUTURE 123 (M. Schnepf ed. 1979). See also Geier, supra note 5, at 660-
67.
10. See Rose, Farmland Preservation Policy and Programs, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J.
591 (1984). Rose provides an excellent explanation of the arguments on either side of the
debate and suggests a proposal to alleviate the fears of both sides.
II. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE STATISTICAL BULLE-
TIN No. 578, POTENTIAL CROPLAND STUDY 16 (1977). See infra note 13.
12. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, PENNSYLVANIA NAT-
URAL RESOURCES INVENTORY 2 (1980).
13. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, THE PROTECTION OF FARMLAND: A
REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 32 (1981) [hereinafter
NALS].
14. See id.; Geier, supra note 5, at 658-64.
15. Nonurban uses include transportation (roadways, rural airports); water resource
development (man-made reservoirs for power, flood control, water supply, recreation); coal
strip-mining; commercial development; and other nonagricultural uses. See Esseks, Nonurban
Competition for Farmland in FARMLAND, FOOD AND THE FUTURE 49 (M. Schnepf ed. 1979).
16. In the 1980 Census of Population, Pennsylvania had 15 Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas, encompassing 30 counties. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COM-
MERCE, PART 40, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: PENNSYLVANIA, 1980
CENSUS OF POPULATION 13 (1983).
17. See supra note 2.
18. See, e.g., USDA POLICY STATEMENT. SECY'S MEMORANDUM No. 1827, SUPPLE-
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icy Act to minimize the extent to which federal programs contribute
to the conversion of farmland.1" Yet the state and local levels are the
locus of action in this area.20
Traditionally, land use was regulated, if at all, at the local
level. 1 State action took the form of generalized enabling acts, most
modeled after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act.22 These
statutes allowed local governments to impose certain restrictions on
use of land within their borders, but they provided no policy direc-
tion for the form or content of the regulations. 8 By 1970, a "quiet
revolution" 2' was taking place. Some states began to take an active
interest in directing land use policy for the state as a whole. 5 State
involvement ranged from issuing policy statements to enacting com-
prehensive plans that virtually preempted local control. 26  Some
MENT 1, Statement on Prime Farmland, Range, and Forest Land, (June 21, 1976). This mem-
orandum directed the USDA to follow these specific policies: advocate the protection of prime
land from premature or unnecessary conversion; assure that environmental impact statements
consider impact on prime farmland; promulgate programs to inventory, assess, and evaluate
the nation's farmland; and cooperate with local officials to assure that concern with food pro-
duction is recognized and emphasized.
19. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4209 (Supp. 1984).
20. See generally NALS, supra note 13.
21. See Rose, Farmland Preservation Policies and Programs, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J.
591, 600 (1984). But see generally Geier, supra note 5 (critique of controlling land use from
the local level).
22. U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed.
1926), reprinted in ALl, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (tent, draft 1968) (Appendix A).
23. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (Purdon 1972 and Supp. 1985). It was
only in 1978 that subsction(b)(5) was added. It states: "(b) zoning ordinances may contain:
(5) Provision for the protection and preservation of natural resources and agricultural
land and activities."
24. The term "quiet revolution" was coined by commentator Bosselman in his
landmark work which suggested that states were taking over the land use planning role hereto-
fore held almost exclusively by local governing bodies. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES,
QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1972).
25. Id.
26. See Juergensmeyer, State and Local Land Use Planning and Control in the Agri-
cultural Context, 25 S.D.L. REV. 463, 466 (1980). See generally Coughlin & Keene, The
Protection of Farmland. An Analysis of Various State and Local Approaches, LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG. (1981). Two of the most comprehensive state land use plans are those of
Oregon, in OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-197.850 and §§ 215.010-215.615 (1983), and Florida,
in the Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act, codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 186.001-
186.901 (West Supp. 1985). A commentator has asserted that the preservation of farmland
was Oregon's primary motivation behini the adoption of its planning statute. Juergensmeyer,
supra at 466. The Oregon program set up a Land Conservation and Development Committee
charged with preparing and enforcing land use policy. The Committee developed fourteen
goals with accompanying guidelines, which constitute mandatory statewide planning standards
related to, inter alia, comprehensive land use planning, environmental quality, recreation, eco-
nomic development, public services, urbanization, and citizens' involvement in planning. ORE-
GON LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS
AND GUIDELINES (1975). Goal 3, which seeks "to preserve and maintain agricultural lands,"
places severe restrictions on conversion to urbanized land, requiring careful consideration of
environmental, social and economic consequences, unavailability of alternative suitable loca-
tions, and a demonstrated need for conversion. Id. at 6.
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states identified preservation of farmland as an integral goal of their
programs.
At present, state and local programs seeking to protect farm-
land take a number of different forms. Measures to preserve farm-
land operate through the four major powers available to state and
local governments: regulation, taxation, 7 acquisition of interests in
land, and exercise of the spending power.2 8 The forms of regulation
include zoning,2 9 subdivision regulation, pollution control, 0 creation
of agricultural districts,8 and growth management.3 2 Use of the tax-
ing power involves differential assessment, 3 property tax credits,-4
and inheritance and estate tax relief.35 Acquisition of interests in
The Oregon program has been challenged and upheld in Oregon courts. Still v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 42 Or. App. 115, 600 P.2d 433 (1979); Joyce v. City of Portland, 24 Or.
App. 689, 546 P.2d 1100 (1976). Studies have found the program to be extremely effective in
reducing conversion of farmland to nonagricultural uses during a period in which Oregon has
sustained dramatic population growth. In addition, it has been a success in gaining public
acceptance and support. See Furuseth, The Oregon Agricultural Protection Program: A Re-
view and Assessment, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 603 (1980); Furuseth, Update on Oregon's Agri-
cultural Protection Program: A Land Use Perspective, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 57 (1981).
27. A discussion of this use of the taxing power to promote the viability of agricultural
production, thus slowing conversion of farmland, is beyond the scope of this comment. Al-
though it is valuable as a facet of a more comprehensive program to help farmers continue
farming, use of the taxing power alone has a low rate of effectiveness. For a brief discussion of
Pennsylvania's use of tax incentives see infra, text accompanying notes 183-93. For an in-
depth discussion see Comment, Agricultural Land Preservation: Can Pennsylvania Save the
Family Farm?, 87 DICK. L. REV. 595, 602-09 (1983); PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY IN-
STITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON LAND & WATER RESOURCES, RESEARCH PUB. No. 100, THE EF-
FECTIVENESS OF ACT 319: THE PENNSYLVANIA FARMLAND AND FORESTLAND ASSESSMENT ACT
(1977); Becker, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural and Forest Land Under Act 319 of
1974: Entering The Second Decade, 90 DICK. L. REV. 333 (1985). For a complete discussion
of various options for differential assessment of farmland, see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENTIAL
ASSESSMENT OF FARMS & OPEN SPACE (1976); NALS, supra note 13, at 56-72.
28. See Keene, Agricultural Land Preservation: Legal and Constitutional Issues, 15
GONZ. L. REV. 621, 668-73 (1980).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 58-74.
30. See Keene, supra note 28, at 624.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 175-82 for a discussion of Pennsylvania's agri-
cultural districting program. For an overview of agricultural districting, see generally NALS,
supra note 13, at 76-97; Myers, The Legal Aspects of Agricultural Districting, 55 IND. L.J. 1
(1979); Conklin & Bryant, Agricultural Districts: A Compromise Approach to Agricultural
Preservation, 56 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 607 (1974). An in-depth study of several agricultural
districting schemes conducted by NALS found that although the benefits of such voluntary
programs are limited, their low cost and popularity make agricultural districting a useful tool
to preserve farmland and the local agribusiness infrastructure it requires in order to remain
economically viable. See NALS, supra note 13, at 93-96.
32. Growth management consists of a variety of tools used within a comprehensive plan
to control the rate and direction of growth within a community. Generally this occurs at the
local level, although comprehensive planning at the state level, such as occurs in Oregon, may
involve growth management techniques. See supra note 26.




land may include the purchase of easements or covenants requiring
that land remain in agricultural use."6 Under an alternative regula-
tory scheme, a local government may purchase development rights in
the land,3 7 retaining the potential to use those rights in a transfer of
development rights program.38 Occasionally, local governments have
purchased fee simple interests in land through land banking
schemes.39 Local governments exercise their spending power, often in
36. Limited use has been made of purchase of easements to allow government control
of land use. NALS, supra note 13, at 148-72.
Currently, purchase of development rights is in vogue as a method of controlling land use
akin to purchase of easements, See infra note 37. A covenant is made which is an agreement
not to use land in a given manner; it does not transfer an interest in land, but instead is purely
a contract right. Legal problems that have developed with purchase of easement agreements
have caused local governments to rely on the purchase of development rights as a similar
alternative in programs to preserve land for agricultural purposes. See Comment, Agricultural
Land Preservation By Local Government, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 961, 977-80 (1982). Covenants
and conservation easements still enjoy some popularity as voluntary methods for conservation
of natural areas. See generdlly Fenner, Land Trusts: An Alternative Method of Preserving
Open Space, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1062-71 (1980); Netherton, Environmental Conservation
and Historic Preservation Through Recorded Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 540 (1979).
37. Purchase of development rights (PDR) programs are an outgrowth of purchase of
conservation easements, and are particularly useful in preservation of agricultural land. Fee
simple ownership can be defined as a bundle of interests or rights. Development rights are
separated from this bundle of rights and purchased by the local governing body either volunta-
rily or through use of the eminent domain power. They must be acquired parcel-by-parcel and
their presence recorded with each deed. Although this is an extremely effective tool to ensure
long term preservation of land for agricultural use, the fiscal and political costs limit its use.
See NALS, supra note 13, at 148-73; Rose, supra note 10, at 614-19.
A limited PDR program in Suffolk County, New York, has had some success in preserv-
ing valuable farmland on Long Island for use primarily for truck-farming and specialty crops.
An in-depth critique is offered in Peterson & McCarthy, Farmland Preservation By Purchase
of Development Rights: The Long Island Experiment, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 447 (1977).
38. Transfer of development rights (TDR) programs are a recent addition to the arse-
nal of land use tools. TDR programs are conceptually very simple. Land in one area of the
political unit is down-zoned for a low intensity use. Landowners are permitted to sell their
development rights to landowners in a transfer district, either directly or through a governmen-
tal "bank." This transfer district is zoned for more intensive use, but landowners in that dis-
trict may increase the density of their tracts above the base level by use of their acquired
development rights. See Torres, Helping Farmers and Saving Farmland, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 3 1,
40-41 (1984).
The concept has enjoyed voluminous treatment, both conceptually and practically. See
generally Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Explanatory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J.
1101 (1975); Merriam, Making TDR Work, 56 N.C.L. REV. 77 (1978); Schnidman, Transfer-
able Development Rights: An Idea in Search of Implementation, II LAND & WATER L. REV.
339 (1976). The legal foundation of TDRs received a great boost when the United States
Supreme Court held their use in an historic preservation program did not constitute a "tak-
ing." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Although originally
used for purposes of historic preservation, the application of TDR programs to preserving
farmland has been widely recognized and often criticized. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 10, at
619-33; Barrows & Prenguber, Transfer of Development Rights: An Analysis of a New Land
Use Policy Tool, 57 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 519 (1975). A thorough treatment and enthusiastic
endorsement is given in Torres, supra.
39. Although it is generally agreed that land banking would give government the best
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conjunction with growth management, to provide, or deny, water
supply, sewerage, and transportation and other infrastructural sys-
tems to areas experiencing growth demand. °
Potentially, state and local governments can utilize all of these
tools in pursuit of a policy to preserve farmland. Traditionally, when
they were used, each was used in isolation from the other."' More
recently, some states, following the lead of Oregon42 and Florida,' a
are implementing comprehensive plans that integrate many of these
tools for the purpose of managing growth and preventing unneces-
sary conversion of prime farmland.
Regardless of the state's regulatory approach, the municipality
remains the locus of land use control."" Although there is usually a
"comprehensive" local plan, 5 and although some communities use
innovative growth control techniques, zoning regulations tend to be
the primary tool which local governments use when resolving the
control over land use, practically it is at variance with American political traditions and ex-
tremely expensive. It has been deemed fairly successful by some researchers as a means of
preserving farmland in Canada. See, e.g., Geier, supra note 5, at 669. In the United States it
has been used extensively only in Puerto Rico, where it was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico in a court challenge. Commonwealth v. Rosso, 95 P.R. 488 (1967), appeal dis-
missed, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (a sufficient public use existed to justify use of eminent domain).
For more information on land banking, see generally A. STRONG, LAND BANKING: EUROPEAN
REALITY, AMERICAN PROSPECT (1979); Note, Public Land Banking: A New Praxis for Urban
Growth, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897 (1972). For discussion of the applicability of land
banking to the preservation of farmland, see Rose, supra note 10, at 610-14; NALS, supra
note 13, at 170-72.
40. See generally Note, Control of Timing and Location of Government Utility Exten-
sions, 26 STAN. L. REV. 945 (1974). For use of the spending power as a tool to control conver-
sion of farmland see Keene, supra note 28, at 668-73; Rose, supra note 10, at 633-39. This
tool is more likely to be upheld if it is part of a comprehensive growth management plan. See,
e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. I (1974); Construction Indus. Ass'n. v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). One state court
has imposed a "regional welfare" test, requiring that decisions regarding service extension re-
present a reasonable accommodation of competing interests. Associated Home Builders of
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 17 Cal.3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1976). One commentator recognizes the importance of service provision. "In many parts of
the country, development of farmland is not possible without water, sewer, and other public
facilities. Soil conditions and underground water resources may permit only limited develop-
ment that is dependent upon on-site well and septic tank sewage disposal. Under these circum-
stances it is possible for state or local governments to prevent the development of farmland by
not providing these facilities." Rose, supra note 10, at 636. But compare the exclusionary
zoning doctrine, infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
41. See NALS, supra note 13, at 16.
42. See supra note 26.
43. See id.
44. See NALS, supra note 13, at 27. But see Geier, supra note 5 (a catalogue of the
increasing involvement of state government in farmland preservation programs).
45. Pennsylvania law requires that zoning ordinances be enacted pursuant to an "over-
all program." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10604(2) (Purdon 1972 and Supp. 1985). However,
local governments are not required to enact zoning ordinances at all if they do not choose to do
so. Id. at § 10601.
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conflicting pressures of development and the agricultural status
quo."" No two communities confront this challenge in the same man-
ner; each responds to local conditions.47 When a strong policy at the
state level48 directs or requires the local government to institute a
particular type of program for the preservation of farmland, more
innovative techniques appear at the local level." Nonetheless, local
governments most often use basic zoning techniques together with
the ad hoc use of the spending power to guide development.50
The Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a number of statutes
designed to slow the unnecessary conversion of prime farmland.5'
These form a collection of noninterrelated measures that primarily
attempt to facilitate continued agricultural production.5" The stat-
utes employ preferential property " 1 and inheritance tax incentives,54
right-to-farm policies,55 and provisions specifically enabling local
governments to use zoning powers to protect prime farmland. 6
Statewide measures are entirely voluntary and impose no mandatory
restrictions on the use of private land. Zoning imposes mandatory
restrictions on land use at the local level.
57
This comment examines various types of agricultural zoning or-
dinances enacted by local governments and discusses possible bases
for attacks upon these ordinances. It surveys current Pennsylvania
legislation, local ordinances and Pennsylvania's developing case law
in this area. It then analyzes the vulnerability of Pennsylvania's agri-
cultural zoning ordinances to successful legal attack. Finally, it sug-
gests ways in which changes may be made in current zoning plans to
ensure adequate protection for prime farmland.
46. See NALS, supra note 13, at 104.
47. See Toner, supra note 6, at 192. He suggests that most local programs are unique,
but identifies several features common to most: reliance on the traditional regulatory devices of
zoning and controlling service provision; flexibility to meet the needs of individual farmers;
tailoring to meet local conditions; and effectiveness through trial and error. See infra note 64.
48. See Geier, supra note 5, at 686-89.
49. See supra note 26.
50. See Keene, supra note 28, at 625.
51. See infra notes 175-203 and accompanying text.
52. See Comment, supra note 27, at 602.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, §§ 5490.1-5490.13 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
54. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1722 (1982).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-957 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 176-82.
56. Supra note 23.
57. See Comment, supra note 27, at 617.
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II. Agricultural Zoning Ordinances
A crucial step in assuring the health of our agricultural econ-
omy is the prevention of unnecessary changes in land use. Of the two
general approaches to preventing changes in land use, zoning and
acquisition of interests in land, zoning is by far the most common.58
Its use as a tool to preserve farmland is a recent phenomenon. His-
torically, land was zoned "agricultural" largely by default, and it
was generally considered a holding zone until needed for another
use.59 Realistically, however, zoning must be used in conjunction
with other programs not specifically related to land use control to
protect farmland successfully and to encourage continued, viable ag-
ricultural production.
Agricultural zoning ordinances are classified by the extent to
which they limit nonagricultural uses in agricultural areas. Ordi-
nances may be either exclusive or nonexclusive.6" Exclusive agricul-
tural zoning ordinances often include an operational definition of
"farm" and prohibit all nonfarm development. Most exclusive ordi-
nances permit some agriculturally related commercial uses."'
Nonexclusive agricultural zoning ordinances are the most popu-
lar type enacted. 2 Nonexclusive ordinances fall into three main clas-
ses, based upon the method by which nonfarm development is con-
trolled: large lot ordinances, fixed area based allocation, and sliding
scale area based zoning.6 8 While schemes within each class share
common features, the uniqueness of each local program dictates that
this is only a general typology.""
Large lot ordinances specify a minimum lot size. Large mini-
mum lot sizes are designed to discourage nonfarm uses. Minimum
lot sizes may range from as few as 10 to as great as 640 acres, de-
pending upon the predominant form of agriculture in the area.6 If
58. See NALS, supra note 13, at 21.
59. See Toner, supra note 6, at 194. Decision-makers are now treating farmland as a
permanent land use. Consequently, zoning changes to nonagricultural uses are more difficult to
obtain.
60. See NALS, supra note 13, at 110-12; Rose, supra note 10, at 600.
61. See NALS, supra note 13, at 110.
62. All agricultural zoning ordinances in Pennsylvania are of the nonexclusive type.
See Comment, supra note 27, at 617.
63. A fourth type of nonexclusive agricultural zoning ordinance, the conditional use
zone, is sometimes identified. Non-farm dwellings are permitted in agricultural areas if they
meet specified criteria. The principal features of conditional use zones are a list of specified
criteria, small lot size maximums, and a case-by-case review. NALS, supra note 13, at 111.
64. In an analysis of 94 agricultural zoning ordinances conducted by NALS, the salient
feature was that no one was an exact replica of any other. See NALS, supra note 13, at 110-
11.
65. See NALS, supra note 13, at 112. For a discussion of large lot ordinances in Penn-
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the minimum lot size is not reasonably defined by its agricultural
utility, the zoning ordinance is subject to challenges that will likely
prove successful.66
Fixed area based allocation permits the landowner to develop
one dwelling unit for each land unit of a specified size. Area based
allocations may be made at any ratio, and generally range from one
unit per ten acres67 to one unit per 160 acres.6 8 The median alloca-
tion is one dwelling per forty acres.69 This zoning method is also
commonly known as quarter/quarter zoning because many ordi-
nances allow one dwelling per quarter/quarter section (forty
acres).7 0 Most ordinances also impose minimum and maximum sizes
for the lots to be developed. In addition, some encourage the cluster-
ing of development, limit development to lower quality land, or im-
pose additional restrictions.71 These additional requirements preserve
large open tracts for cropland. Because development rights are
framed in terms of units per a fixed number of acres, the number of
units permitted on a given tract is directly proportionate to the size
of the tract.
The sliding scale area based model also allocates development
rights based upon the number of acres in the tract, but the number
of dwellings permitted per acre decreases as the tract size in-
creases. 72 Although this method of allocation is similar to that used
in a fixed area based model, the sliding scale area based model does
not allocate dwelling units in direct proportion to the number of
acres in a tract. A typical sliding scale area based ordinance may
permit the development of one unit on tracts under five acres; two
units on tracts of fifteen to thirty acres; three units on tracts of thirty
to sixty acres; and one additional unit for each thirty acres thereaf-
ter. 7" The typical sliding scale area based ordinance, like the fixed
sylvania, see infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 214-19.
67. See NALS, supra note 13, at 116. A zoning ordinance in Hartford County, Mary-
land is one example.
68. See id. A Harvey County, Kansas ordinance is an example.
69. See id.
70. See Toner, supra note 6, at 200.
71. See NALS, supra note 13, at 123-27.
72. The number and proportion of lots permitted reflects differing patterns of land use
and growth pressure. See Toner, supra note 6, at 201. See NALS, supra note 13, at 119-20.
73. This scheme is in operation in Shrewsbury Township, York County, Pennsylvania.
Shrewsbury Township, Pa., Zoning Ordinance § 504(l) (Nov. 10, 1976). An additional re-
striction requires that these dwellings be located on poor quality land where feasible. Tracts
with only prime or very good quality land are limited to a maximum of two units per tract.
The constitutionality of this scheme was upheld in Boundary Drive Assoc. v. Shrewsbury Twp.
Bd. of Supervisors, 507 Pa. 481, 491 A.2d 86 (1985).
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area based ordinance, often includes additional restrictions imposing
minimum and maximum lot sizes and limiting siting of the units. 4
III. Constitutional Theory of Zoning Challenges
Advocates advance five constitutional arguments to attack zon-
ing ordinances in general which may be applicable to the more spe-
cific local agricultural zoning ordinance as well. Conceptually, these
arguments include: a "taking" challenge; a substantive due process
challenge; an equal protection challenge; an exclusionary zoning
challenge; and a procedural due process challenge.
The most successful and commonly used challenges are the tak-
ing and substantive due process (hereinafter due process) challenges.
While these two theories of attack are conceptually distinct, neither
the courts nor the commentators agree upon which to apply in a
given situation.75 Courts frequently confuse and blend elements of
the two theories when responding to challenges to zoning regulations.
Although this comment examines these two theories of constitutional
attack separately, plaintiffs and courts typically blur the distinctions
between them.
A. "Taking"
The term "taking" was popularized by Bosselman and Callies in
their seminal work on the constitutional limitations on governmental
regulation of private land.7 The taking issue arises from the Just
Compensation Clause of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution: "nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation. 7 1 This prohibition extends to state and
local action through the fourteenth amendment.
Essentially, a taking challenge to a zoning regulation alleges
that the regulation has in fact, although not physically, taken so
much of the landowner's private property interest that the govern-
ment must provide just compensation for the interest taken. The gov-
ernment has in effect used its eminent domain power without provid-
ing the requisite compensation. The traditional remedy for
74. For an in-depth study of the operation of three different sliding scale area based
zoning models in Pennsylvania, see COUGHLIN, KEENE & ASSOCIATES, AGRICULTURAL PRO-
TECTION IN SHREWSBURY, HOPEWELL, AND PEACH BoTToM TOWNSHIPS (1984).
75. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.
Ct. 3108 (1985). See generally Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of Land Use
Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57
WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982).
76. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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regulatory taking is invalidation, 78 but a recent trend may allow a
regulatory taking to trigger payment of compensation."
The United States Supreme Court first applied the taking prin-
ciple to governmental regulation in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.80 In that case, a property owner who owned surface rights
sought to enjoin the coal company that owned the subsurface min-
eral rights from mining coal in a manner that would cause surface
subsidence. A Pennsylvania statute, the Kohler Act, 81 prohibited the
mining of coal without structural underground support where subsi-
dence would cause damage. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
found the Kohler Act unconstitutional because it destroyed the coal
company's right to mine without providing structural underground
support, a property interest which the Pennsylvania courts recog-
nized as an estate in land. Justice Holmes' conclusion rested, as well,
on the assumption of risk by Mahon's predecessor, who had pur-
chased only the surface rights. Holmes wrote that "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." 2
Although Pennsylvania Coal made the Just Compensation
Clause applicable to regulatory takings, it did so in language which
severely blurred the line between challenges based upon the Just
Compensation Clause and challenges based upon due process.
Holmes' test, "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking," ' was vague. The Court soon thereafter heard two more
cases dealing with regulatory taking challenges. In Euclid v. Am-
bler,8" the Court held that zoning was a permissible exercise of the
police power, but it did not reach the taking issue. In Nectow v.
Cambridge,83 the Court determined that when a zoning classification
reduced the plaintiff's land to "comparatively little value,"86 the loss
in value to the property outweighed the value to the public interest
in placing that zoning classification on the plaintiff's property, ren-
dering the ordinance invalid as applied. The Court did not couch its
decision in "taking" language; instead it invalidated the regulation
78. See Comment, supra note 75, at 717.
79. See id. at 728. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
81. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-671 (Purdon
1966)).
82. 260 U.S. at 415.
83. Id.
84. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
85. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
86. Id. at 187.
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because no clear community interest counterbalanced the regulatory
burden on the plaintiff.8 7 Because the Court rarely consented to hear
land use cases, Pennsylvania Coal set forth the test for all subse-
quent taking challenges.
Consequently, until the late 1970's only the state courts refined
the taking doctrine. Three main approaches evolved. The first and
most prevalent appears in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills.8 8 The court examined the bur-
den of the regulation upon the landowner's property rights. If the
ordinance restricts the use of the land so that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose, it constitutes a taking in violation of the
Just Compensation Clause.
The second approach is illustrated in Fred F. French Investing
Co. v. City of New York.89 In that case, the court balanced the im-
pact of the regulation against the legitimacy of its objective. It mea-
sured the impact by the extent to which the property was rendered
''unsuitable for any reasonable income productive or other private
use for which it is adapted, and . . . its economic value, or all but a
bare residue of its value [destroyed] ."90 It determined the legitimacy
of the regulation's objective by examining the closeness of the rela-
tionship of the ordinance to the protection of the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. Whether the ordinance consti-
tutes a legitimate use of the police power is an issue that generally
arises in due process challenges.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied a third approach. In
Just v. Marinette County,91 the court permitted a severe restriction
on the landowner's use of his land because the public's interest in
environmental conservation outweighed the owner's interest in using
the land as he pleased.
Zoning designed to keep land in agricultural use has been up-
held in both California 92 and Oregon93 courts. The California Su-
87. Id. at 188.
88. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
89. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990
(1976).
90. Id. at 593, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
91. 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); see also Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336
A.2d 239 (1975).
92. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979); Furey v. City of Sacramento, 24 Cal.3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rtpr. 684
(1979); Helix Land Co., Inc. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App.3d 932, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683
(1978); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 776 (1978).
93. See, e.g., Still v. Board of County Comm'rs of Marion County, 42 Or. App. 115,
600 P.2d 433 (1979); Joyce v. City of Portland, 24 Or. App. 639, 546 P.2d 1100 (1976).
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preme Court has uniformly held that an ordinance which results in a
mere diminution of property value is not invalid; an ordinance is in-
valid only if it deprives the landowner of substantially all reasonable
use of the property.' Where the land zoned "agricultural" is, or
might easily be, productive, there remains a reasonable use of the
property. Oregon case law has sustained Oregon's comprehensive
state-controlled land use scheme,96 echoing California's view that
where land can be put to use for farming there can be no taking.96
The Supreme Court entered the land use arena again with Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.' Plaintiffs, owners
of Grand Central Terminal, and U.G.P. Properties, lessees of air
rights above the terminal, challenged New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law.' 8 Under this law, a building designated as a
landmark could not be modified without Commission approval. The
Commission disapproved of U.G.P.'s plans to build an office building
above the terminal because of the effect on the terminal's historic
value. Plaintiffs alleged that this action constituted a taking without
just compensation and violated the Due Process Clause. Their claims
were sustained by the trial court but reversed at the appellate level.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, found
neither a taking nor a denial of due process.
Justice Brennan adopted a four-part inquiry" to determine
when "justice and fairness"100 require compensation. First, the court
must determine whether the interest at issue is a property interest. If
so, second, the court must characterize the property interest in-
volved. Third, the character of the governmental action must be ana-
lyzed. If the action is made pursuant to a public program designed to
protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare then it
will be upheld unless it is unduly harsh. If the action is an acquisi-
tion of the plaintiff's resources to facilitate a public function it may
be characterized as a taking. Finally, the court must examine the
nature and extent of the action's interference with property rights,
particularly "investment-backed expectations." 101
94. See supra note 92.
95. See supra notes 26 and 93.
96. But see, Smeja v. County of Boone, 34 I1. App. 3d 628, 339 N.E.2d 452 (1975)
(zoning a 50-acre tract, 15 acres of which were submarginal farmland and 35 acres of which
were woods, for exclusive agricultural use bore no substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, and thus was invalid).
97, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
98. NEW YORK, N.Y.. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-10.0 (1976).
99. 438 U.S. at 124-28.
IO0. Id. at 124.
101, Id.
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Again, the Court gave little guidance by which other courts
might determine the severity of interference which must occur before
a taking is found. Again, as in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's rea-
soning indicated that the determination of whether a taking has oc-
curred must be made on a case-by-case basis. The primary guidance
in the majority opinion in Penn Central is clear: if the ordinance
prohibits only the most beneficial use of the land, no taking oc-
curs.102 If the regulation causes virtually complete destruction of a
property interest, a taking may occur, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case. 103
The Supreme Court heard a challenge to an open space zoning
ordinance in Agins v. City of Tiburon.0° The city rezoned land that
plaintiffs previously acquired for residential development. The rezon-
ing permitted single family dwellings and open space uses, with den-
sity restrictions allowing from one to five single family dwellings on
the five-acre tract of land.105 The plaintiffs alleged that the land had
greater value than any other suburban property in California, and
that the ordinance prevented plaintiffs from realizing its develop-
ment potential, thereby completely destroying the property's value.
The Court declined to decide whether the application of this or-
dinance to the plaintiffs' land constituted a taking; the plaintiffs had
not submitted a revised development plan for their property and thus
a ripe controversy did not exist. 10 6 The only question properly before
the Court was whether the enactment of the zoning ordinance consti-
tuted a taking per se. The Court held that it did not, 07 and identi-
fied two instances in which a zoning law will effect a taking. A tak-
ing occurs "if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests,"10 8 or if it denies an owner "economically
viable use of his land."10 9 Although there is no precise definition of
when a property has been taken, a court must weigh the private and
public interests affected in making the determination. °10 The Court
102. Id. at 125-27.
103. In another examination of the taking issue, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979),
the Supreme Court found that the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1976), and the
Migration Bird Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976), prohibiting sale of birds legally killed before the
Acts became effective, did not give rise to a taking. "At least where an owner possesses a full
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle [the right to sell] is
not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 444 U.S. at 65-66.
104. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
105. Id. at 257.
106. Id. at 260.
107. Id. at 259.
108. Id. at 260.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 261.
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found that California advanced legitimate goals by its policy of
preventing the unnecessary conversion of open space to urban uses
through the enactment of local open space zoning schemes. There-
fore, the ordinance in question benefitted the public interest by en-
couraging careful and orderly development. " In addition, the ordi-
nance did not prevent "the best use" of the land because it allowed
the plaintiff to build from one to five houses on his five-acre tract." 2
The Court had another opportunity to determine whether a zon-
ing ordinance constituted a taking in San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
v. City of San Diego."3 The plurality opinion did not reach the tak-
ing issue, however, but remanded the case to the state court because
of the absence of a final judgment."" The dissenting opinion, written
by Justice Brennan with three justices joining," 5 did reach the mer-
its. In addition, Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in the plurality
holding, agreed with Justice Brennan's characterization of the mer-
its."' Justice Brennan's dissent has been cited with approval in nu-
merous subsequent cases," 7 and is characterized by many as reflect-
ing the state of the law on the issue." 8
Justice Brennan found that a government's exercise of its regu-
latory police power can effect a taking within the meaning of the
Just Compensation Clause. Whether a taking occurs is determined
not by the form of the action, but by its effect." 9 If the effect is so
onerous as to reach the level of a taking, compensation must be paid
from the effective date of the regulation to the date it is rescinded or
Ill. Id. at 262.
112. Id.
113. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
114. 450 U.S. at 630-33. The Court held the judgment would not be final until the state
court addressed two issues: whether the ordinance constituted a taking of appellant's property
and whether compensation was just. The courts below had never specifically decided whether
the ordinance effected a taking.
115. Id. at 636.
116. Justice Rehnquist stated, "If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a 'final
judgment or decree' . . . I would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." 450 U.S. at 633-34. One commentator aptly indi-
cated the importance of Justice Rehnquist's agreement with Justice Brennan.
When the best, most liberal Justice of the Burger Court's San Diego panel,
joined on the substantive issue by the Court's most conservative member, derides
the California Supreme Court for its parochial, muddled views on takings, in-
verse condemnation and the Constitution, more is at work than a mere disserta-
tion on private property rights.
Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Bren-
nan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 94-95 (1983).
117. See, e.g., MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984); Her-
nandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
118. See supra notes 116-17.
119. 450 U.S. at 657.
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amended.1 20 The distinction between a taking that requires just com-
pensation and an invalid exercise of the zoning police power is artifi-
cial; where the effects are the same, just compensation is due.
121
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Ham-
ilton Bank,1 22 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to review a
jury's grant of damages in inverse condemnation for a zoning taking.
In that case, a zoning ordinance reduced the allowable density on a
tract which had already received preliminary approval for develop-
ment. The jury in the United States District Court found that the
ordinance denied the plaintiff "economically viable" use of its prop-
erty in violation of the Just Compensation Clause,123 and awarded
damages for the temporary taking pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2"
The District Court enjoined the Planning Commission from applying
the regulations to the plaintiffs property, but concluding that a tem-
porary deprivation could not constitute a taking, granted judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the damages claim to the Commis-
sion. " The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the application
of the zoning ordinance constituted a temporary taking of plaintiff's
land. 2
The Supreme Court refused to reach the merits, finding the
plaintiff's claim premature as in San Diego.127 The Court held that
the plaintiff must first use the procedures provided under state law to
obtain just compensation, 28 and the case was remanded. The Court
stated that the constitutionality of the regulation, whether the chal-
lenge rests upon a taking or due process theory, depended "upon an
analysis of the effect of the Commission's application of the zoning
ordinance . . . on the value of respondent's property and investment-
backed expectations.' 29 In this case, the Court could not perform
that analysis because the plaintiff had not taken all possible actions
to seek a variance.
Recently, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,30
120. Id. at 658.
121. Id. at 659.
122. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
123. Id. at 3111.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
125. 105 S. Ct. at 3111.
126. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402
(6th Cir. 1984).
127. 105 S. Ct. at 3117.
128. Id. at 3121-22. The Court, however, would not require that plaintiff exhaust all
review procedures. Id. at 3121 n. 13.
129. Id. at 3124.
130. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
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the Supreme Court once more had an opportunity to make a defini-
tive statement on the taking and inverse condemnation issues. In that
case, the appellant sought to subdivide a property, at least part of
which was planted with corn. The zoning board's rejection cited sev-
eral reasons, including inadequate infrastructural access, for its re-
jection. The appellant accused the county of denying the application
in order to perpetuate agricultural use as an open-space buffer. The
California appellate courts found the Agins131 decision to be control-
ling; irrespective of appellant's factual allegations, damages for in-
verse condemnation were foreclosed.
Once again, a majority of the Court (joined by Justice Brennan)
found that by failing to submit the plans for the use of the property,
the appellant had failed to seek a "final and authoritative determina-
tion of type and intensity of development legally permitted on the
subject property."' 32 The dissent'33 found that the opinion below
stated a takings claim and stated that the landowner need not take
fruitless measures to seek a "final" ruling. Only Justice White,
joined by then Chief Justice Burger, would follow Justice Brennan's
San Diego dissent, requiring compensation for the temporary
taking. 134
Without a definitive answer to the taking question from the Su-
preme Court, the circuit and state courts remain split. The Ninth
Circuit and California courts tend to require that a regulation deny
the landowner all economic use of his property to effect a taking. 
s"
In MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara,136 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found no taking in the denial of the plaintiff's re-
quest to log seven thousand acres of rangeland, which he had pur-
chased for investment purposes. Instead, the court found that the
denial of the permit did not interfere with the land's current use as
marginal rangeland. Furthermore, it did not interfere with his "in-
vestment-backed expectation" because he could continue to hold the
land until some future time when another use might be permitted.
3 7
The court stated that the expectation of a particular use is not the
131. 24 Cal.3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), affid, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
132. 106 S. Ct. at 2566.
133, Id. at 2569 (by Justice White with then Chief Justice Burger joining and with
Justices Powell and Rehnquist joining Parts I, II, and III finding a taking).
134. Id. at 2573.
135. See, e.g., MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2705 (1985); William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco,
605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (regulation that reduced
value of land from 2 million to 100,000 dollars did not effect a taking),
136. 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2705 (1985).
137. 749 F.2d at 547.
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same as an assurance of that use. An interest in anticipated gains is
considered less compelling than other property-related interests.138
The court stressed that the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that
a mere diminution in value cannot establish a taking, and it stated
that the denial of the highest and best use of the land was not a
taking.
This approach contrasts with that of the Sixth Circuit. The
Hamilton Bank decision at the court of appeals level demonstrates
the contrast.139 In that case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a diminution in value is a significant interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations, and, therefore, found a taking.
B. Substantive Due Process
The constitutional doctrine used most successfully to defeat zon-
ing ordinances is a substantive due process argument. The substan-
tive due process doctrine requires that government not deprive citi-
zens of life, liberty, or property interests unless a legitimate public
purpose outweighs those interests. A zoning regulation violates sub-
stantive due process if it is not a legitimate use of the police power.
To constitute a legitimate use of the police power, the regulation
must be substantially related to the general public health, safety, or
welfare.1 40 The due process attack on zoning regulations is fre-
quently used in conjunction with a challenge based upon the Just
Compensation Clause. Often the two theories are not conceptually
distinguished; instead the arguments supporting each challenge
merge. The genesis of the confusion between the two theories of at-
tack may be Justice Holmes' use of language relating to both theo-
ries in his Pennsylvania Coal opinion.""
The essence of the due process argument is that the challenged
zoning regulation is not a reasonable exercise of the police power.
One commentator suggests that the due process challenge provides a
better, more encompassing approach, 4 2 although the tests used are
substantially similar to those used in finding a taking in violation of
138. Id. at 548.
139. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402
(6th Cir. 1984).
140. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.
Ct. 3108, 3122-23 (1985); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
141. One commentator has noted that the attempt to distinguish a regulation from a
taking is "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law
• . . one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." C. HARR,
LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (1976).
142. Comment, supra note 75.
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the Just Compensation Clause.143 First, the regulation must serve
some public end. Second, the measure employed must bear a reason-
able relationship to the purpose of the regulation. Third, the means
must not unduly injure the individual. Finally, public interest in the
regulation must be balanced against harm to the individual.
Traditionally, the remedy for both unconstitutional takings and
due process violations has been invalidation of the unconstitutional
ordinance.' Although by its nature a successful taking challenge
theoretically requires that just compensation be paid, invalidation is
generally found to afford adequate relief because the land is not
physically taken. Whichever challenge is used, recent decisions sug-
gest a trend toward allowing the finding of a regulatory taking or of
a breach of due process to trigger payment of compensation.
145
One tactical argument in favor of using a due process challenge
rather than a taking challenge is that under the due process theory
government regulatory action need not occur for a public function.1 46
Any police action which is unreasonable could result in a due process
violation. When a taking for "public use" cannot be found, a due
process violation might arise. Furthermore, a broader range of reme-
dies may be available to the plaintiff who successfully challenges a
zoning ordinance on due process rather than on taking grounds.
When a taking challenge is successful, the regulation can remain in
effect if the government entity is willing to pay just compensation.
A regulation in violation of due process, however, must be invali-
dated because the violation of substantive due process goes to the
heart of the government's authority to adopt the regulation." 8 Even
if the regulation is invalidated, the plaintiff might still have a cause
of action for damages under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act." 9
C. Equal Protection
Equal protection challenges to zoning are not made as fre-
143. See id. at 722-23. See generally Developments In the Law - Zoning, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1427 (1978).
144. See Comment, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity
of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (1974); Comment, Just Compensation
or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regu-
lation, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 714 (1982).
145. See supra note 79.
146. See Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV.
559, 599 (1981).
147. See Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum
of Its Parts, PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 301, 347-48 (1981).
148. See id.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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quently as taking or substantive due process challenges, although
this theory may be successful in certain limited situations. A broad
interpretation of the equal protection theory posits that the ordi-
nance in question does not bear alike on all regulated landowners. In
one case, Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v. Golla,150 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an ordinance that permitted
the development of five lots per tract, regardless of the tract's size,
had an arbitrary and discriminatory impact on different landowners.
The court found that because the owner of a small tract could devote
a greater percentage of the total acreage owned to development than
the owner of a large tract, the regulation imposed a lesser burden on
owners of small tracts. Because the court could find no overriding
public interest to outweigh this disparate treatment, it invalidated
the ordinance. In a later case, Boundary Drive Association v.
Shrewsbury Township Board of Supervisors,15 1 the same court
found that although the sliding scale area based ordinance therein
did not bear equally on all landowners, the township had a rational
basis for its disparate treatment.
Federal courts do not readily accept equal protection challenges.
In Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 52 the plaintiff alleged that a zon-
ing ordinance amendment violated equal protection guarantees be-
cause it discriminated against developers who had previously ob-
tained approval for their projects. The court rejected this argument,
stating that to prevail on this claim the developer must show that
there was no rational relationship between this ordinance and the
public interest. The court noted that it applies a strict scrutiny anal-
ysis only when suspect classifications based upon race, national ori-
gin, or alienage are made.'15 This reluctance to entertain an equal
protection challenge in zoning cases is reflected in the Supreme
Court's requirements that intent to discriminate must be shown.
154
D. Exclusionary Zoning
"Exclusionary zoning" is a hybrid constitutional challenge
which has emerged recently. This concept is most highly developed
150. 499 Pa. 246, 452 A.2d 1337 (1982).
151. 507 Pa. 481, 491 A.2d 86 (1985).
152. 616 F.2d 680 (3rd Cir. 1980).
153. Id. at 687 n.29.
154. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (community not required to change zoning which precluded devel-
opment of low and moderate income housing unless intent to discriminate is shown); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York. 155 The concept origi-
nally was used to challenge zoning ordinances that were implicitly
designed to keep blacks from moving into white suburban areas, and
it was based on equal protection language. The challenge has broad-
ened to include challenges by developers who would provide housing
for lower and middle income families. Most claims allege that zon-
ing ordinances restricting the development of multifamily dwellings
deny these classes of persons equal protection and due process be-
cause they are unable to purchase the single-family dwellings that
are available. This challenge is most prevalent where land is down-
zoned to decrease density in order to maintain economic, social, and
racial homogeneity. 156
The defending municipalities must justify the use of such a re-
strictive zoning scheme. The courts have not clearly identified valid
countervailing local interests. An analysis of exclusionary zoning
cases identifies certain invalid justifications: protecting the character
of the community; preserving property values by excluding undesir-
able property uses; maximizing tax revenues; and avoiding construc-
tion of new municipal services.'5 7 Ecological concerns may be consid-
ered but cannot be a smokescreen for invalid concerns. When a valid
legitimate purpose is asserted, such as encouraging orderly growth or
providing for specific housing needs, the courts will carefully scruti-
nize the ordinance to determine whether it is the least exclusionary
restrictive alternative.
158
Earlier cases focused on large lot and total exclusion of use
analyses. A due process approach was generally applied when ordi-
nances were found to be exclusionary due to large minimum lot size
requirements." 9 A per se approach applied when the zoning totally
excluded multi-family dwellings.'6 0
The current mode of analysis focuses on the actual exclusionary
155. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371
A.2d 1192 (1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d
236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Twp., 476
Pa. 183, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
156. See generally, Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
157. See Developments in the Law, supra note 143, at 1652-54. See, e.g., Appeal of
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
158. See Developments in the Law, supra note 143, at 1657-58.
159. See, e.g., Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (2- and 3-
acre minimum lot sizes unconstitutional because of exclusionary effect); National Land and
Inv. Co. -v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (4-acre minimum lot size
unconstitutional).
160. See, e.g., Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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effect of the ordinance, using a substantive due process analysis to
determine whether legitimate public needs outweigh this effect.1"1
Exclusionary motive or lack thereof is not a critical element.162 Re-
cent cases focus on regionalism as an analytical device to determine
whether the actual effect of an ordinance is exclusionary. Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 63 is the
leading case developing this regional, or "fair share," approach. In
that case, the court stressed that each developing community must
provide for its fair share of the region's low and moderate income
housing needs when making local zoning decisions.
Some decisions have suggested that this concept applies only to
areas where growth pressure is strong. There may be no need to pro-
vide for a variety of housing needs where there is no local demand
for low income housing or a nearby municipality is better suited for
such development. 6" However, these defenses must be clearly estab-
lished or they will be rejected. Zoning ordinances partially or totally
excluding certain uses will be closely scrutinized where growth pres-
sure exists.106
The exclusionary zoning concept, as state courts have inter-
preted it, is a potent threat to agricultural zoning. This threat is
strongest in areas where growth pressure exists. Nevertheless, preser-
vation of prime farmland is crucial if conversion is not to be irrevers-
ible. It is in these areas that the courts will carefully scrutinize agri-
cultural zoning ordinances to determine whether their effect is de
facto exclusionary in regard to low and moderate income housing.
E. Procedural Due Process
A final challenge which might be used against agricultural zon-
ing regulations is a challenge based upon procedural due process.
The scope of procedural due process is vague. Two basic conditions
161. See, e.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Twp., 476 Pa. 182,
382 A.2d 105 (1977).
162. See id. at 193, 382 A.2d at 110. This court confirmed that findings of exclusionary
zoning in Pennsylvania are based on the exclusion of certain uses, not on the exclusion of
specific classes of people, thereby turning to a due process model for the exclusionary zoning
concept.
163. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
164. Cf. Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (sub-
urb where there were no low income residents or employment opportunities and which was
surrounded by communities permitting low income housing did not violate Constitution with
its zoning restrictions); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Twp., 476 Pa.
182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977) (regional fair share test considers exclusionary effect only after
growth pressure and presence of undeveloped land are established).
165. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1973); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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must occur for a successful challenge. First, the government act
challenged must be administrative rather than legislative. 66 Second,
the regulation must result in the deprivation of a protected life, lib-
erty, or property interest.' 67
In the zoning context, it is difficult to distinguish legislative
from administrative bodies and functions. Three tests have been used
by the courts to distinguish between administrative and legislative
acts. '6 The first test examines the nature of the decision-making
body. Elective bodies, such as city councils, are legislative; appoin-
tive bodies, such as zoning boards, are administrative. The second
test examines the nature of the decision. Decisions such as the adop-
tion of a comprehensive plan are legislative; decisions such as the
granting of variances are administrative. The third test examines the
nature of the action of the body. General policy formulation tends to
be legislative; the application of general policies to specific property
tends to be administrative.
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that a proce-
dural due process theory may be an appropriate vehicle to challenge
a zoning regulation. In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc.,' "69 a city charter provision required that proposed land use
changes be ratified by fifty-five percent of the voters. 7 0 The Court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the provision was an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power. However, in a note, the
Court suggested that the critical constitutional inquiry was a proce-
dural due process issue: whether the method of imposing the zoning
restriction produced "arbitrary or capricious results.'
7'
As with all the constitutional theories used to challenge zoning
regulations, the plaintiff must show that the regulation deprives him
of a protected life, liberty, or property interest. A protected property
interest is more difficult to discern when the use of land is merely
being regulated than when the land itself is physically taken. 72 Fur-
thermore, when deprivation of a protected property interest can be
shown, a taking challenge or a due process challenge is a better the-
ory. 73 Although a procedural due process challenge may be a more
166. See Developments in the Law, supra note 143, at 1503. See also, e.g., Rogin v.
Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3rd Cir. 1980).
167. See Developments in the Law, supra note 143, at 1503.
168. See id. at 1508-13.
169. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
170. Id. at 670.
171. Id. at 675-76 n.10.
172. See Developments in the Law, supra note 143, at 1503.
173. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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difficult theory to use to challenge a land use regulation, it may have
some value when used in conjunction with one of the previously dis-
cussed challenges if damages are sought.
174
IV. Agricultural Zoning in Pennsylvania
The validity of local agricultural zoning ordinances can not be
viewed in isolation. Instead the framework of state enabling legisla-
tion and farmland preservation policies must be examined when ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of local zoning ordinances. Several zon-
ing ordinances with the express purpose of preserving agricultural
land have been challenged in Pennsylvania. These challenges must
be considered in conjunction with other challenges in the federal
courts and in other state courts in order to determine which local
agricultural preservation programs will survive future challenges.
A. State Legislation
Pennsylvania farmland preservation legislation is a largely
noninterrelated patchwork of independent programs. 17 5 Measures at
the state level are voluntary. They are primarily designed to provide
incentives for farmers to continue to farm and to enable local gov-
ernments to enact zoning ordinances which will preserve prime
farmland.
The major vehicle by which the Commonwealth seeks to protect
agricultural production is the Agricultural Area Security Law [here-
inafter AASL] .376 The AASL expresses a Commonwealth policy of
conserving and protecting farmland and of encouraging agricultural
production.17 7 The AASL encourages farmers owning fifty or more
acres to form, in cooperation with a local government unit, voluntary
Agricultural Areas of five hundred or more acres.178 After certain
specified procedures are followed, the AASL offers four types of pro-
tection to participants: a limitation on the power of local govern-
ments to regulate farming practices or bring nuisance suits;1 79 a re-
quirement that state agencies facilitate agricultural production
174. The violation of procedural due process may be asserted as a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693-95 (3rd Cir. 1980).
See also Comment, Damages or Compensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations,
37 ARK. L. REv. 612, 630-36 (1984).
175. For an in-depth discussion of all the different programs involved, see Comment,
supra note 27. See also COUGHLIN, KEENE., supra note 74, at 5-8.
176. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-915 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
177. Id. § 902.
178. Id. § 905.
179. Id, § 911.
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whenever possible; 180 eminent domain protection; 8 1 and authoriza-
tion to county governments to institute purchase of development
easement programs. 8 ' The procedural complexity of forming an ag-
ricultural area and its voluntary nature raise questions as to its effi-
cacy as a comprehensive scheme to preserve agricultural land.
A property tax relief program in the form of differential assess-
ment, by which farmland may be assessed at its agricultural use
value rather than its market value, is another state program to en-
courage landowners to resist conversion of farmland to nonagricul-
tural uses. 83 Two separate statutes exist. Under Act 515,184 counties
may enter into covenants with owners of farmland, restricting devel-
opment of the land for at least a ten year period.' 85 As part of this
covenant, the county agrees that the land will be taxed on its fair
market value as restricted.' 86 If a landowner breaches the covenant
he must pay the county liquidated damages equaling the tax savings
for no more than five years plus a 5% penalty based on the tax sav-
ings received.
87
After a challenge to Act 515188 as violative of the Uniformity
Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution,'89 the legislature amended
the Constitution to allow differential taxation of forest and farm
land' 90 and passed an alternative differential assessment act. The
Pennsylvania Farmland and Forest Land Assessment Act of 1974' 91
permits a farmer to apply to the county Board of Assessment Ap-
peals to request differential tax treatment. 9 If agricultural use is
abandoned, the landowner must pay a tax rollback and penalty. 93
The Commonwealth's only involvement in agricultural zoning is
180. Id. § 912.
181. Id. § 913.
182. Id. § 914.
183. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, §§ 5490.1-5490.13 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
184. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit, 16 §§ 11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
185. Id. § 11943.
186. Id.
187. Id. § 11946.
188. Bensalem Twp. School Dist. v. County Comm'rs, 8 Pa. Commw. 411, 303 A.2d
258 (1973) (statute neither directly imposes tax nor exempts property; requires only that as-
sessment reflect fair market value of land).
189. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § I.
190. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2i.
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5490.1-5490.13 (Purdon Supp. 1985). This Act is popu-
larly known as the Clean and Green Act.
192. Id. § 5490.3. The landowner must have ten or more contiguous acres which have
been devoted to agricultural use for at least three years.
193. Id. § 5490.8. The rollback recaptures tax savings for up to seven years. In addition,
a penalty of six percent of the tax savings realized is imposed.
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in the form of amendments to the zoning enabling act, 9 " which con-
fers zoning powers on municipalities. One amendment provides that
"zoning ordinances may contain . . . provisions for the protection
and preservation of natural resources and agricultural land and ac-
tivities.' 1 95 Another provides that when zoning ordinances are insti-
tuted they shall be designed to provide, inter alia, for preservation of
"prime agriculture and farmland considering topography, soil type
and classification, and present use."' 9"
Agricultural zoning ordinances are subject to the same restric-
tions as are other zoning ordinances, and the municipalities' actions
in instituting agricultural zoning are subject to any restrictions gen-
erally placed upon municipalities. The state does not require that
municipalities promulgate zoning ordinances; it only enables them to
do so to promote the public health, safety, morals, and general wel-
fare. 9 7 Although a municipality need not exercise its zoning powers,
when zoning ordinances are instituted they must be promulgated in
accordance with an "overall program."
1 98
The Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)199 provides that the
procedures set forth therein are the sole method of securing review
of any zoning ordinance. 00 A landowner wishing to challenge a zon-
ing ordinance that restricts the use of land in which he has an inter-
est must first submit the challenge to a zoning hearing board, or to
the appropriate local governing body, together with a request for a
curative amendment.101 If this request is denied, he may then appeal
to a court. 02 Until recently, the sole judicial relief available was in-
validation. However, an amendment enacted in 1978 permits the
judge to order the proposed development or use approved as to all or
some of its elements. The court retains jurisdiction during any fur-
ther proceedings and may "issue such supplementary orders as it
deems necessary to protect the rights of the landowner ....
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10601-10619 (Purdon 1972 and Supp. 1985).
195. Id. § 10603(b)(5).
196. Id. § 10604(3) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
197. Id. § 10604(l).
198. Id. § 10604(2).
199. Id. §§ 11001-11202 (Purdon 1972 and Supp. 1985).
200. For a discussion of the resulting restriction of remedies, see Comment, Judicial
Relief in Exclusionary Zoning Cases: Pennsylvania's Definitive Relief Approach, 21 VILL. L.
REV. 701 (1975).
201. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(I) (Purdon 1972 and Supp. 1985).
202. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1) (Purdon 1972).
203. Id. § 11011(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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B. Zoning Ordinances
Local agricultural zoning ordinances in Pennsylvania vary
widely, applying the basic nonexclusive categories of large lot, fixed
area based, and sliding scale area based zoning. Each local zoning
scheme is, ideally, specifically designed to consider the topograph-
ical, demographic and farmland use characteristics of that area.2 °4
Minimum lot sizes ranging from four to sixty acres have been
successfully imposed in various Pennsylvania municipalities. 05 Large
lot ordinances must show a reasonable relationship to the legitimate
purpose of preserving farmland if they are to survive constitutional
challenges. 06 Overly small lot sizes suggest that agricultural preser-
vation is not the true purpose of the ordinance. Overly large lot sizes
may be unpopular with many landowners who may desire to develop
small portions of their land to alleviate financial difficulties or pro-
vide living space for a grown child. Although a large lot zoning pro-
gram is the simplest to administer, it has proven unpopular with
farmers because it is deemed overly restrictive.
Fixed area based allocations either provide for a specified num-
ber of dwellings per tract or, more commonly, employ a linear scale.
Only a few Pennsylvania municipalities have ordinances specifying a
fixed number of dwellings per tract.2 0 7 Those ordinances employing a
linear scale permit from one unit per ten acres to one unit per 160
acres. The most common ordinances in Pennsylvania permit one
dwelling per twenty-five acres or one dwelling per fifty acres. 208 In
enacting a fixed area based ordinance, it is important for a local gov-
ernment to ensure that the number of dwellings permitted does not
increase population density in the agricultural areas to such a degree
as to interfere with agricultural uses.
Sliding scale area based zoning is becoming increasingly popu-
204. In National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that because each zoning case involves different circum-
stances, the validity of an ordinance must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Because of
varying characteristics, it is impossible to say that any minimum acreage requirement is per se
unconstitutional.
205. The NALS study analyzed 40- and 50-acre minimum lot sizes in Berks County.
NALS, supra note 13, at 114-15.
206. The minimum lot size should serve to provide a piece of land which is large enough
to support a profitable farm operation as well as large enough to deter rural subdivision devel-
opment. NALS, supra note 13, at 112. A minimum that is too small will defeat the goal of
farmland preservation, as "spot" development will occur. One study identifies the "core farm-
ing unit" as the minimum amount of land needed to support a full-time farming operation.
COUGHLIN, KEENE, supra note 74.
207. G. Malone, Zoning As A Means to Preserve Agricultural Land II (September
1985) (unpublished manuscript prepared for PBA-Agricultural Law Committee Meetings).
208. Id.
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lar in Pennsylvania. The concept was developed in York County and
has become prevalent in York and Lancaster Counties and in nearby
counties in Maryland." ' The sliding scale area based allocation in
Shrewsbury Township, York County, is typical of most.210 One
dwelling is permitted on the first five acres, a second on the next ten,
a third on the next fifteen, and one dwelling additional for each
thirty acres thereafter. A limitation of only two dwellings per tract is
imposed if any prime farmland is to be used. In addition, the ordi-
nance provides that dwelling lots are not to exceed forty thousand
square feet, that the lowest quality land must be used where feasible,
and that any subdivision larger than the maximum lot size must con-
tain a minimum of fifty acres of cropland.
Under sliding scale area based plans a landowner with a small
parcel is entitled to a higher density of dwelling units than a land-
owner with a large tract. Because the allocation applies to all parcels
in existence as of the effective date, a landowner cannot split and re-
split his parcel. Additional standards governing placement and size
of lots within a parcel facilitate the retention of large blocks of farm-
land while permitting the landowner to realize some appreciation in
the value of his land. Some ordinances permit additional dwelling
units where land is of poor soil quality or otherwise unsuitable for
farming.2 11 This method is politically attractive because landowners
are not foreclosed from selling small parcels of land, while the goal
of preserving farmland is still served.
C. Case Law
Although challenges to land use ordinances have been brought
in Pennsylvania on the full range of theories discussed above, Penn-
sylvania courts have focused on two concepts in examining the chal-
lenged zoning regulations. First, the courts have analyzed zoning or-
dinances under a due process analysis, requiring that they be
reasonable in relation to a legitimate police power goal. Second, the
courts have examined the exclusionary effect of ordinances, deter-
mining whether they serve to exclude certain uses from the political
subdivision.
Challenges to those zoning ordinances enacted with the express
purpose of farmland preservation are a recent phenomenon in Penn-
209. NALS, supra note 13, at 118-19.
210. Id.
211. In Peach Bottom Township, York County, an unlimited number of additional
dwellings are permitted where soil is of poor quality; a lot minimum of 40,000 square feet is
imposed. COUGHLIN, KEENE, supra note 74, at 39.
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sylvania. Challenges to minimum lot sizes, however, found early suc-
cess on the grounds that they were exclusionary. These suits involved
lot sizes of four acres2 12 or less,2 13 and they involved land that was
rezoned to ensure lower population density.
The legislature's express policy of preserving farmland, as pro-
vided in the 1978 amendments to the zoning laws and the AASL,
provides local governments with an explicit legitimate goal for agri-
cultural zoning. In Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v.
Golla,214 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordi-
nance that was part of a local plan with the express purpose of pre-
serving farmland. The township ordinance involved in that case per-
mitted each landowner to separate up to five I /-acre lots from his
tract, regardless of the size of the original tract. The court used a
balancing of interests test to determine whether the ordinance was
invalid. The court recognized the legitimate objective of the ordi-
nance. However, since the restriction deprived the landowner of his
constitutional rights of property, it could only be sustained if it was
"clearly necessary '' 215 to preserve agricultural land. The court found
that the severity of the restriction in that case outweighed the legiti-
mate objectives. It also found that the ordinance had a discrimina-
tory effect on different landowners, with owners of small tracts able
to devote a greater percentage of their total acreage to dwelling units
than owner of large tracts. A strong dissent 16 cited the overriding
public interest in preserving prime farmland as tipping the balance
of interests in favor of the ordinance.
The position of Pennsylvania courts is unclear regarding the
minimum lot size which may be imposed for purposes of preserving
farmland. Martin v. Millcreek217 is the only case in which a large lot
ordinance enacted expressly for the purpose of preserving farmland
has been challenged. The Commonwealth Court invalidated the ordi-
nance establishing a ten-acre minimum lot size. The court found that
establishing ten-acre lots would be counterproductive to the goal of
preserving farmland.
212. See, e.g., National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965)
(4-acre minimum acreage requirement not a reasonable method to achieve otherwise valid
objective of preservation of open space).
213. See, e.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Twp., 476 Pa. 182,
382 A.2d 105 (1977) (effect of ordinance permitting only single-family residences on I-acre
lots was constitutionally exclusionary, precluding fair share of low and middle-income
housing).
214. 499 Pa. 246, 452 A.2d 1337 (1982).
215. Id. at 257, 452 A.2d at 1342.
216. Id. at 261, 452 A.2d at 1345.
217. 50 Pa. Commw. 249, 413 A.2d 765 (1980).
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In Codorus Township v. Rodgers,218 the Commonwealth Court
recently held that an ordinance restricting division of productive
farmland to tracts with a minimum of fifty acres was neither arbi-
trary nor unreasonable given the setting and the fact that a compre-
hensive plan was in place. The court applauded the nationwide trend
toward the use of zoning as a tool to preserve farmland, and it found
that there was "no magical number" by which that goal could be
served.19 It emphasized that although the Codorus Township ordi-
nance was rationally related to the legitimate goal of preserving
farmland in that township, that same minimum might not be valid in
another situation. Only case-by-case scrutiny under a due process
analysis can determine the validity of an ordinance.
Two other Commonwealth Court cases provide guidance re-
garding zoning devices which might be overly restrictive or arbitrary.
In Snyder et. al. v. Railroad Borough,220 the court held that a local
ordinance permitting two dwellings per tract as of right in an area
zoned "Rural Agricultural or Conservation" was valid. However, a
taking occurred in the portion of the same tract where the land was
zoned "Conservation," no development was permitted and, therefore,
no profitable use whatsoever was possible. Using the "diminution in
value" test from Pennsylvania Coal, the court found that the ordi-
nance rendered the land "valueless or no longer useful in a reasona-
ble manner."22 In Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township
Planning Commission,22 the court invalidated an amendment to an
unrelated ordinance which rezoned a tract from industrial to agricul-
tural contrary to its designation on a township comprehensive plan.
The court found this to be a case of arbitrary and discriminatory
"spot zoning"; although the stated intent was to "preserve the rural
nature and agricultural integrity of the township," there was no fac-
tual indication that the amendment had this effect.
223
Pennsylvania is one of the leading states in developing the con-
cept of exclusionary zoning. Although the theoretical basis for find-
ing a zoning ordinance exclusionary has shifted and remains unclear,
218. 89 Pa. Commw. 79, 492 A.2d 73 (1985).
219. Id. at 84-85, 492 A.2d at 75. The court cited with approval decisions from two
other jurisdictions: Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 Ill. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981)
(160-acre minimum in agricultural district upheld, even though market value was diminished
from $1,440,000 for development to $500,000 as farmland); Gisler v. County of Madera, 38
Cal. App.3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974) (minimum 18-acre parcel upheld).
220. 59 Pa. Commw. 385, 430 A.2d 339 (1981).
221. Id. at 395, 430 A.2d at 345.
222. 89 Pa. Commw. 468, 492 A.2d 818 (1985).
223. Id,. at 474, 492 A.2d at 821-22.
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the Pennsylvania courts have developed a clear framework within
which to test zoning ordinances to determine whether they have an
exclusionary effect.
The earlier exclusionary zoning tests used a strictly case-by-case
approach. The first Pennsylvania case to face this problem was Na-
tional Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn.224 In that case, the zoning
ordinance imposed a four-acre minimum lot size, permitting only
single-family dwellings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that
the township was in the direct path of suburban development from
Philadelphia. Although the township argued a need to preserve the
character of the community, provide open space, and prevent the ser-
vice infrastructure from being overburdened, the court held that
none of these otherwise legitimate goals could necessarily control. A
municipality must not use its zoning power to prevent newcomers
from entering the community.
Exclusionary zoning challenges continued to be considered on a
case-by-case basis. In Appeal of Girsh,22 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recognized de facto exclusion. Although multi-family units
were not explicitly prohibited by local ordinances, they were not pro-
vided for in the community's comprehensive zoning plan. The court,
citing National Land, reaffirmed the proposition that protecting the
character of the community was not a sufficient justification for fore-
closing multi-family units in the township.226 Development patterns
had so changed that formerly rural communities were now suburbs.
If it is found that a municipality is in a location in which a demand
for apartments exists, the zoning plan must provide land for their
construction.
The court shifted to a "fair share" analysis 22 7 in Township of
Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.228 It found that although an
eighty-acre site was provided in the township for multi-family dwell-
ings, this site, by virtue of its size, represented only "tokenism. "229
By providing for selective admission, the zoning plan effected a de
facto partial exclusion. The court followed New Jersey's lead in
Mount Laurel' 30 and held that a township must meet its fair share
224. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
225. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
226. Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 398.
227. The "fair share" principle was developed in the New Jersey Supreme Court's
widely followed decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Lau-
rel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
228. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
229. Id. at 448, 341 A.2d at 467.
230. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
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of the present and projected housing needs in the region. The provi-
sion for apartment construction in only 80 out of a total of 11,589
acres in the township was not a fair share in view of the population
growth in that region.
Although in Willistown the court affirmed the use of a due pro-
cess analysis to extend the fair share principle to cover partial exclu-
sion and selective admission practices, it did not define the measure
of "fair." In Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Providence
Township,"a' the court remedied that omission by developing an ana-
lytical framework to determine the exclusionary impact of an ordi-
nance. First, the court will determine whether the community is a
logical area for development. 22 If it is, the court will examine the
present population density and availability of undeveloped land. 33
Finally, if the area is in the path of population growth and is not
highly developed, the court will examine the ordinance to determine
whether its effect is exclusionary.3 When exclusion is partial, the
percentage of land within the township available for multi-family
dwellings under the zoning scheme becomes relevant.
Recent cases continue to stress the Surrick three-step test, re-
quiring that the plaintiff show strong evidence of the first two factors
before the court will determine whether the effect of the ordinance is
exclusionary.2 35 In Appeal of Kravitz, 3 6 a plurality of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court refused to find the failure to provide for town-
houses exclusionary considering the township's distance from major
employment centers, low projected population growth, and lack of
major highway links. Given these factors, the actual effect of the
ordinance was not unreasonable. 3 7 The strong dissenting opinion
chastised the plurality for providing too relaxed a level of judicial
review. The dissenting justices found that the absence of a provision
for townhouses was exclusionary because townhouses often provided
moderate income families with the only possible opportunity to own
a home. 23s Recent cases suggest that the courts will scrutinize more
closely zoning ordinances that entirely preclude a given use, even
231. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
232. Id. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 193-94, 382 A.2d at Ill.
235. See. e.g., Appeal of Kravitz Co., Inc., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983); Town-
ship Supervisors of Adams Twp. v. West, 79 Pa. Commw. 254, 469 A.2d 701 (1983).
236. 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983).
237. The Commonwealth Court, in West, 79 Pa. Commw. 254, 469 A.2d 701, affirmed
this analysis, expressly stating that Surrick had overruled prior case law so that total exclusion
of a use was no longer per se exclusionary.
238. 501 Pa. 200, 216, 460 A.2d 1075, 1084.
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when the first two factors of the Surrick test are not present. 2 9
Successful exclusionary zoning challenges in Pennsylvania have
involved municipalities in the path of population growth. In these
rural-urban fringe areas, agricultural zoning ordinances may run
afoul of exclusionary zoning principles. An example of how exclu-
sionary zoning may affect agricultural zoning ordinances in rural-
urban fringe areas can be seen in the Commonwealth Court's deci-
sion in In re Application of Wetherill.24° That case involved a zoning
challenge in West Nantmeal Township, twenty miles west of Phila-
delphia. Six percent of the land use in that township was residential,
sixty-one percent cropland, twenty-nine percent woodland, and four
percent other uses.241 There was no zoning provision for multi-family
dwellings, and thirty-seven percent of the land zoned for single-fam-
ily dwellings had a minimum lot size requirement of ten acres. 42
The court found that this township was in a logical location for de-
velopment because of its proximity to Philadelphia and to a turnpike
interchange. The township's justification, among others, that the or-
dinance would preserve prime farmland was untenable, and the court
declared the large lot ordinance unconstitutional.
D. Remedies
An action in inverse condemnation may be brought in Pennsyl-
vania under the Eminent Domain Code 24 3 when a de facto taking
occurs. When a zoning ordinance is involved, however, the Common-
wealth Court has held that the landowner's remedy is not a claim for
damages under the Eminent Domain Code, but rather a challenge to
the validity of the ordinance following the procedures outlined in the
MPC.244
The Commonwealth Court has ruled, however, that a zoning or-
dinance effects a taking of private property without just compensa-
tion when the property affected is rendered valueless or without rea-
sonable use. 245 In an earlier case, Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment ,24
239. See, e.g., Sultanik v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester Twp., 88 Pa. Commw. 214,
488 A.2d 1197 (1985); Cracas v. Board of Supervisors of West Pikeland Twp., 89 Pa.
Commw. 424, 492 A.2d 798 (1985).
240. 45 Pa. Commw. 303, 406 A.2d 827 (1979).
241. See Keene, supra note 28, at 655.
242. 45 Pa. Commw. at 306, 406 A.2d at 828.
243. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to 1-903 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
244. Sorbara v. City of Pittsburgh, 80 Pa. Commw. 425, 471 A.2d 927 (1984); Kraiser
v. Horsham Twp., 72 Pa. Commw. 16, 455 A.2d 782 (1983); Wyoming Borough v. Wyco
Realty Co., 64 Pa. Commw. 459, 440 A.2d 696 (1982).
245. Snyder v. Railroad Borough, 59 Pa. Commw. 385, 430 A.2d 339 (1981) (land
zoned for a conservation district with no other profitable use allowed was invalid taking; issue
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that the line between regu-
lation and "taking" was shadowy, but it held that if a zoning regula-
tion deprives the landowner of his lawful use, it amounts to a taking
for which he must be justly compensated. 47
Until recently, judicial relief for unconstitutional zoning ordi-
nances was limited, under the MPC, 248 to invalidation. As the Penn-
sylvania courts invalidated zoning ordinances because of their exclu-
sionary effect, municipalities simply replaced them with other
equally restrictive regulations. Critics charged that without definitive
relief going beyond invalidation, municipalities easily circumvented
the intended impact of the courts' decisions.2 9 In response, the
courts provided definitive relief by requiring that the defendant mu-
nicipalities accept part or all of the successful plaintiff's development
plans.
Following the courts' lead, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted
amendments to the MPC empowering the courts to provide definitive
relief by issuing "such supplementary orders as it deems necessary to
protect the rights of the landowner as declared in its opinion and
order. 250 Since these amendments were enacted, however, the courts
have not recognized a claim for damages in a case in which a zoning
regulation has been successfully challenged. Nevertheless, this provi-
sion suggests the availability of a judicial prerogative to award dam-
ages in the proper circumstances.
V. Will Agricultural Zoning Prevail?
Agricultural zoning with the express purpose of preserving
farmland is a recent phenomenon in Pennsylvania. Amendments to
the state zoning enabling act251 and Pennsylvania Constitution2 52
substantiate preservation of farmland as a state policy and legitimate
goal in the exercise of the police power by local governments. The
Agricultural Area Security Law, 2 5 enacted in 1981, plainly shows a
commitment by the state to encourage local governments to provide
for the preservation of prime farmland.
Treating land zoned "agricultural" as a permanent resource
of damages not raised).
246. 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
247. Id. at 372, 200 A.2d at 412.
248. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § I1011 (Purdon 1972).
249. See Comment, supra note 200.
250. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
251. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603(b)(5) and § 10604(3) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
252. PA. CONST. art. VIIi, § 2i.
253. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-915 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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rather than as a holding zone increases the likelihood of challenges
to agricultural zoning ordinances as developers clash with municipal-
ities over the ultimate use of the land. The form that these agricul-
tural zoning ordinances take and the regional perspective of local
zoning officials when enacting comprehensive zoning schemes will be
crucial determinants when the ordinances are challenged. Three
main factors affect the likelihood that a nonexclusive agricultural
zoning ordinance will be invalidated as applied to a particular tract
of land: the quality of the land, the present use of the land, and the
growth pressure in the surrounding region.
The quality of the land and its present use are related to the
three inquiries a court is likely to make when using a predominantly
due process analysis to determine the validity of a challenged agri-
cultural zoning ordinance. First, the court will examine the legiti-
mate purpose of the ordinance. 54 The MPC expressly enables a mu-
nicipality to "preserve prime agricultural and farmland considering
topography, soil type and classification, and present use. ' ' 255
Second, the court will determine whether the methods used
therein are reasonably related to that goal.256 Where the protected
land is of prime or good quality, the regulation is more clearly re-
lated to the legitimate goal of preserving farmland.5 7 Where the
land is currently used for productive cropland, there is an even more
direct relationship between the regulatory restriction and the end of
preserving valuable farmland.
Third, the court will examine the impact of the zoning ordi-
nance on the landowner's property interests.2 58 Pennsylvania courts
have used a diminution in value test to determine whether the ordi-
nance effects a taking.2 59 Recent decisions in Codorus260 and Bound-
ary Dr2ve261 suggest that the courts will not invalidate a zoning regu-
lation merely because it depresses the value of a tract of land. Where
soil is of prime or good quality and where the land is currently used
for agricultural production, the courts should find a reasonable eco-
nomic use. Investment-backed expectations should also be satisfied
where the land retains a viable agricultural use. 62 As the agricul-
254. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
255. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10604(3) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 211-23.
257. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 76-139 and accompanying text.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21.
260. 89 Pa. Commw. 79, 492 A.2d 73 (1985).
261. 507 Pa. 481, 491 A.2d 86 (1985).
262. See, e.g., Snyder et. al. v. Railroad Borough, 59 Pa. Commw. 385, 430 A.2d 339
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tural utility of a tract declines, whether because of poor soil quality,
inefficient size, or a poor location, a court will scrutinize more closely
the reasonableness of the regulatory methods by which that land is
protected.
Finally, where pressure for growth exists in the surrounding re-
gion, the agricultural zoning ordinance is likely to encounter an ex-
clusionary zoning challenge. 2 8 The court will examine the munici-
pality's comprehensive zoning scheme using the three-step test
developed in Surrick." It will then determine whether the chal-
lenged ordinance is exclusionary as applied to the landowner's devel-
opment plan.
Where growth pressure exists, the courts will clearly scrutinize
agricultural zoning ordinances more closely. The Pennsylvania courts
have developed two lines of cases in this area. Analysis in the first
involves a mixture of due process and takings theory.'" It is this
analysis which the courts currently use to examine agricultural zon-
ing ordinances expressly designed to preserve farmland. The second
line of cases involves exclusionary zoning challenges.266 Challenges
using this theory of attack have successfully invalidated one-acre to
four-acre minimum lot size zoning ordinances, but have not success-
fully invalidated more carefully constructed agricultural zoning ordi-
nances. As growth pressure increases, however, exclusionary zoning
challenges may prove successful in invalidating some agricultural
zoning ordinances.
In a primarily due process challenge the court will, first, ascer-
tain whether a comprehensive plan exists in the municipality. Sec-
ond, it will determine whether the challenged ordinance is reasona-
bly related to a legitimate goal of preserving farmland.
When a municipality uses a large lot model for agricultural zon-
ing, it must show that its true purpose is to preserve farmland. This
goal should be overtly expressed as part of the comprehensive plan.
It must also be reflected in its function; the minimum lot size must
be reasonably related to agricultural use in the area. As noted ear-
lier, the Commonwealth Court, in Martin v. Millcreek,2 7 invali-
dated a ten-acre minimum lot size because of a projected adverse
effect on maintaining viable agricultural tracts; the court did not in-
(1981).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 224-42.
264. 476 Pa. 182, 192-94, 382 A.2d 105, 110-11 (1977).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 212-23.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 224-42.
267. 50 Pa. Commw. 249, 413 A.2d 765 (1980).
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dicate what lot size would be acceptable. In Codorus Township v.
Rodgers 268 the same court permitted a fifty-acre minimum for pro-
ductive farmland, but stressed that this same minimum might not be
applicable in another community under differing soil and demo-
graphic conditions. A municipality imposing a large lot minimum
must demonstrate a relationship between that size and the type of
agriculture prevalent in the community. Voluntary agricultural dis-
tricting pursuant to the AASL exhibits a true intention to farm. The
fact that an agricultural district is in place through the initiative of
the local landowners strengthens the legitimacy of agricultural zon-
ing ordinances.
The same problems arise with fixed area based ordinances. The
zoning body must demonstrate that sufficient land is included in the
agricultural zoning scheme for agricultural production to be viable.
A fixed area based scheme may encounter equal protection chal-
lenges asserting discriminatory impact. Landowners holding fewer
than the minimum number of acres from which one lot may be de-
veloped may not have a viable agricultural use for this smaller tract,
yet they will be precluded from subdividing their land. Pennsylva-
nia's fixed area based ordinances most commonly permit either one
dwelling unit per twenty-five acres or one unit per fifty acres.2 69
While a zoning ordinance permitting one unit per fifty acres should
pass the court's scrutiny (given good quality land and present or po-
tential agricultural use), the reasonable relation to the goal of pre-
serving farmland of a one-acre to twenty-five-acre ratio is less clear.
Additional restrictions involving clustering of dwelling units, maxi-
mum lot sizes, and preference for construction on lower quality land
will place the zoning ordinance in a more reasonable relationship to
the expressed goal.
A sliding scale area based scheme is the type of zoning ordi-
nance most likely to survive a challenge and is the most popular for-
mat with local landowners. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
cently scrutinized a typical sliding scale zoning ordinance in
Boundary Drive Association v. Shrewsbury Township.2 0 The court
found that the scheme did not discriminate against either small or
large landowners. With a sliding scale scheme, small landowners re-
ceive the right to develop proportionately more dwelling units per
acre, consistent with expectations that are probably not related to
268. 89 Pa. Commw. 79, 492 A.2d 73 (1985).
269. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
270. 507 Pa. 481, 491 A.2d 86 (1985).
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agricultural use. In Shrewsbury Township only the first thirty acres
of a large tract are zoned on a sliding scale; acreage over thirty acres
is zoned in a linear fashion. The court found that this scheme was
rationally related to the protection of larger tracts, which are better
suited to efficient agricultural uses. In addition, the court approved a
two dwelling maximum restriction on tracts of prime farmland be-
cause the provision was an integral part of a larger comprehensive
zoning scheme in the township.
A municipality must assess the political popularity of a particu-
lar type of agricultural zoning ordinance. Although this factor is not
directly related to either the court's due process or exclusionary
analysis, it is directly related to the likelihood that a landowner will
challenge the ordinance. The sliding scale model is most popular be-
cause it is well designed to meet the landowner's expectations for the
use of his land.
Exclusionary zoning is the other major theory which may be
used to attack agricultural zoning ordinances.27 The court is un-
likely to hear an exclusionary challenge unless pressure on the mu-
nicipality for growth is shown. As population pressure increases,
scrutiny of the zoning scheme becomes closer. Municipalities will
then need to show a closer relationship to a stronger legitimate pur-
pose, as well as provision for the housing needs within the municipal-
ity. Although the validity of large lot ordinances has been litigated
under this theory, challenges were not directed toward land which
had been zoned "agricultural" pursuant to the new, clear state pol-
icy. In an exclusionary zoning challenge, the court is unlikely to dif-
ferentiate among zoning models; instead, the entire municipal zoning
scheme will be examined.27 2
The best defense against an exclusionary zoning challenge is the
provision of a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality.
Where growth pressure exists, the plan must provide adequate land
for the expansion of apartment and townhouse development. Munici-
palities should discontinue the practice of zoning land "agricultural"
as a holding zone. When the municipality has zoned land "agricul-
tural" it must show that the land is, or can be, agriculturally produc-
tive and that the ordinance is necessary for the continued support of
agriculture in that area. The legitimacy of agricultural zoning ordi-
nances is strongest where sufficient agricultural production exists in
the area to support the agricultural industry infrastructure.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 155-65.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 227-42.
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When a plaintiff successfully challenges an agricultural zoning
ordinance, the only remedies presently available are those provided
in the MPC.273 Pennsylvania courts have interpreted this narrowly,
suggesting that invalidation is the only available remedy. When ex-
clusionary zoning is found, the courts may provide definitive relief,
requiring that the municipality permit part or all of the successful
plaintiff's proposed development. This remedy, legislatively sanc-
tioned through amendments to the MPC, has been sparingly applied
in only limited situations.
Remedies are more readily available in the federal courts. An
action is available under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act2 74 to
recover damages when a zoning ordinance violates due process. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has never clearly declared
that relief in damages is mandatory under that federal statute. Re-
cently, in Williamson Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 7 5 the Court remanded the case to the state courts, requiring
that a plaintiff challenging a zoning ordinance exhaust the requisite
state procedures before receiving a hearing at the federal level. This
decision suggests that a plaintiff's remedies in Pennsylvania may
practically be limited to invalidation. No Pennsylvania appellate
court case has yet challenged the availability of a remedy in dam-
ages by judicial discretion under the amendments to the MPC.
2 76 If
the United States Supreme Court mandates relief under section
1983, this Pennsylvania statute may provide the authorization for
such relief under Pennsylvania law.
VI. Conclusion
Pennsylvania now has an express policy supporting the preserva-
tion of farmland with local governments as the locus of activity.
There have been several challenges to the validity of local agricul-
tural zoning ordinances. As growth pressure increases in formerly
rural areas, agricultural zoning ordinances will be challenged more
frequently. The success of these challenges depends largely upon the
design of the zoning scheme within the municipality: the comprehen-
siveness of the plan, the legitimacy of the goals, the appropriateness
of the means, and the presence of provisions for a variety of land
uses. If local zoning officials pay close attention to these factors, the
273. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11001-11202 (Purdon 1972 and Supp. 1985).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
275. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
276. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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courts should uphold reasonable agricultural zoning ordinances.
Zoning alone cannot permanently preserve farmland. Local offi-
cials will be pressured to convert farmland to other uses. This pres-
sure will come from both outside land developers and local landown-
ers. The disparity between the value of land for agricultural purposes
and its value for development may ultimately cause some agricul-
tural zoning schemes to fail. In addition, where a genuine need exists
for housing, commercial development, and industrial development,
zoning schemes must provide for those uses even at the risk of loss of
farmland. The only way to permanently protect prime farmland is to
enact zoning ordinances that are reasonably related to that goal in
combination with other programs that increase the feasibility of con-
tinued agricultural production, even in the face of financial and
growth pressures.
Rosadele Kauffman
